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The thesis presents two reflections on what it might mean to read Wallace Stevens 
philosophically. The first section argues that we would be better off avoiding the 
search for a supreme fiction in Stevens’ poetry. By the poet’s own standards, he never 
succeeded in creating one. The second section attempts to justify the abandonment of 
the search for the supreme fiction by suggesting another, perhaps more productive way 
in which Stevens’ poetry might be philosophically read. In particular, it will be argued 
that what Helen Vendler calls Stevens’ “qualified assertions” can be seen as a potent 
technique for the avoidance of philosophical dogmatism. 
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   1
  What follows are two reflections on what it might mean to read Wallace 
Stevens philosophically. The first section argues that we would be better off avoiding 
the search for a supreme fiction in Stevens’ poetry. By the poet’s own standards, he 
never succeeded in creating one. The second section attempts to justify the 
abandonment of the search for the supreme fiction by suggesting another, perhaps 
more productive way in which Stevens’ poetry might be philosophically read. In 
particular, it will be argued that what Helen Vendler calls Stevens’ “qualified 





“After all, I like Rhine wine, blue grapes, good cheese, endive  
and lots of books, etc., etc., etc., as much as I like supreme fiction.” 
Wallace Stevens, December 8, 1942 
 
  If, as Foucault says, the author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of 
meaning, then it is in the spirit of interpretive thrift that this section will draw upon 
Wallace Stevens’ letters and essays. The author’s words will be used to make the case, 
as simply and sparingly as possible, for giving up the quest to identify the “supreme 
fiction,” Stevens’ most ambitious philosophical object. The poet hoped to usher in the 
creation of an idea that would serve as a fictive replacement for the idea of God, 
known to be fictive but willfully believed. His hope has remained unfulfilled. By the 
poet’s own explicit standards, the supreme fiction does not appear in any of his poems, 
nor in his poetry as a whole, nor in poetry in general. Is it possible for such a long-
standing critical quest to be abandoned, or at least qualified as a lesser priority? The   2
case of Oedipus and the “tragic flaw” offers a hopeful parallel. At one time, it might 
have seemed inevitable that readers of Oedipus Rex would always ask of Sophocles’ 
play which of Oedipus’ negative character traits had brought about his tragic downfall.
 
1 It might have seemed a profound, challenging and worthwhile question, posed but 
left unresolved by Aristotle in his definition of tragedy. But once the “tragic flaw” was 
recognized as a Victorian mistranslation of Aristotle’s “hamartia,” the impetus behind 
the hunt lessened. Critics were still free to follow the tragic flaw’s trail, but without 
Aristotelian sanction, the hunt seemed less worthwhile. Today, it has largely receded 
from scholarly view. 
  So might scholars one day give up attempting to identify the “supreme fiction” 
in Stevens’ poetry. As I will argue, Stevens offers little or no sanction for the idea that 
the supreme fiction can be found there, or even that it exists at all. To read or teach 
Stevens as though the creation of a supreme fiction were the culmination of his career 
is to be set up for an unnecessary disappointment. If I cover a good deal of very well-
trodden critical ground in what follows, and make points that seem obvious to many 
readers of Stevens, it will be in the spirit of offering a summarizing reminder: a 
presentation of what seem to me the most salient arguments in favor of not reading 
Stevens for a supreme fiction, and a collection in one place of the most relevant 
evidence. 
 
  To what extent did Wallace Stevens lay claim to the title of philosopher? Did 
he see himself as an inventor of fine philosophical ideas?  
  On the one hand, Stevens read widely in philosophy, and his poetry, essays and 
letters abound with references to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, James, Santayana, 
                                                 
1 See E. R. Dodds’ “On Misunderstanding the Oedipus Rex” in Erich Segal, ed., Greek Tragedy: 
Modern Essays in Criticism (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).   3
Bergson, Kant, Plato, Lucretius, Vico, Descartes, Hegel, Berkeley: the list could go 
on. He corresponded with philosophers of his time, such as Jean Wahl, and from the 
start of his career, his poetry is sprinkled with philosophical-sounding terminology and 
ruminations. He struggled and toyed, through a long poetic career, with various forms 
of “the dumbfoundering abyss / Between us and the object,”
2 whether the 
epistemological distance between knowers and things in themselves, or the equally 
taunting “failure in the relation between the imagination and reality” (WS 649). In 
doing so, he gave poetic expression to perhaps the central philosophical drama of the 
modern era. The philosopher Simon Critchley calls Stevens, against great competition, 
“the philosophically most interesting poet to have written in English in the twentieth 
century.”
3 Numerous essays and book-length studies attest to the philosophical depth 
and complexity to be found in Stevens’ works. 
  On the other hand, Stevens himself confessed, in a letter toward the end of his 
life, to having “never studied systematic philosophy,” saying that he “should be bored 
to death at the mere thought of doing so. I think the little philosophy that I have read 
has been read very much in the spirit of… a substitute for fiction.”
4 Frank Doggett, 
one of the earliest and most respected philosophical interpreters of Stevens’ poetry, 
suggests that the “concepts that emerge from long reading of the poetry of Stevens are 
so slight and so basic that any elementary course in philosophy or even a few years of 
interested reading could yield all of them.”
5 Stevens’ most concerted phase of 
philosophical reading does not appear to have begun until the early 1940’s, or at the 
                                                 
2 From “Saint John and the Back-Ache,” in Wallace Stevens, Collected Poetry and Prose (New York: 
The Library of America, 1997), 357, hereafter cited as “WS.” 
3 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are: Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 15. 
4 Holly Stevens, ed., Letters of Wallace Stevens (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1966), 636, hereafter cited 
as “L.” 
5 He continues that they “are usually some variation of the idea of the subject-object relationship” 
(Frank Doggett, Stevens’ Poetry of Thought [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966], viii-ix).   4
earliest the mid-1930’s, when the poet was already in his fifties.
6 As an undergraduate 
at Harvard, Stevens met with the philosopher George Santayana, but their meetings 
appear to have revolved around poetry and the exchange of poems, rather than 
philosophical discussion. The young Stevens took no philosophy courses, never saw 
Santayana lecture, and concentrated instead on literary study and journalism. 
Throughout his life, he confessed an intermittent insecurity about his philosophical 
skills.
 7 
  There appears to have been a brief period, in the wake of his increased 
attention to philosophy in the early 1940’s, when Stevens at least flirted with the idea 
of attempting a more systematic and orthodox work of philosophy, or joked about 
doing so. It was during this time that he created his longest and most philosophically 
ambitious poem, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” and began writing the highly 
theoretical essays on reality and the imagination that would eventually be collected as 
The Necessary Angel. “[I]f I had nothing else in the world to do except to sit on a 
fence and think about things,” Stevens writes in 1942 to his wealthy expatriate friend 
Henry Church, whom he admired for spending his life in precisely this way, “… I 
could very well do a THEORY OF SUPREME FICTION, and I could try to do a 
BOOK OF SPECIMENS, etc.” (L 431). He soon abandons the idea, however, 
proposing it instead as a project to “occupy a school of rabbis for the next few 
generations” (L 435). If Stevens ever considered writing a theoretical treatment of the 
supreme fiction in philosophical or critical prose, the ambition passed.  
  Especially after his intensified interest in philosophy began to wane, Stevens 
came to insist that even his most philosophy-laden poetry should not and could not be 
read for a paraphrasable, systematic doctrine. He may even have seen his prose in this 
                                                 
6 WS 966; Joan Richardson, Wallace Stevens: The Later Years 1923-1955 (New York: Beech Tree 
Books, 1988), 170-1, 175. 
7 Richardson 385; L 476.   5
light. In the introduction to The Necessary Angel, he reminds the reader that the essays 
which follow “are not pages of criticism or of philosophy” (WS 640). Perhaps his 
most strictly philosophical work, the 1951 lecture “A Collect of Philosophy,” includes 
the definitive and uncharacteristically unqualified statement, “I am not a philosopher” 
(WS 860). The lecture itself lends some credence to Stevens’ disavowal. Not only 
does the “Collect” deal exclusively with the “poetic” rather than logical, doctrinal or 
systematic aspects of philosophy, but it seems to have been collected largely from 
letters written by Stevens’ friends and from the summaries contained in Arthur 
Kenyon Rogers’ 1917 introductory textbook, A Student’s History of Philosophy. 
Though the philosopher Paul Weiss, one of the friends Stevens quotes in the lecture, 
invited Stevens to submit the final version of the essay for publication in the Review of 
Metaphysics, he eventually retracted the offer and returned the manuscript. Stevens 
later declined to have it published in any form.
8 In his final years, he repeatedly made 
clear that he did not view his poetry as a philosophical system disguised in symbol and 
sound. To Sister Bernetta Quinn, in 1952, he writes, “My object is to write esthetically 
valid poetry. I am not so much concerned with philosophical validity” (L 752). Again, 
to an aspiring reviewer in 1954: “[W]e are dealing with poetry, not with philosophy. 
The last thing in the world that I should want to do would be to formulate a system” (L 
864). 
 
  And yet, and yet – there is the supreme fiction. It would be extremely 
misleading to suggest that Stevens was without philosophical ambition, either in the 
early 1940’s or later. But it was an ambition of a very particular kind. Stevens 
                                                 
8 L 736. For Weiss’ view of the episode, see Lee Margaret Jenkins, Wallace Stevens: Rage for Order 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000), 73-74.   6
summarizes his project in an important biographical note written in 1954, less than a 
year before his death:  
The author’s work suggests the possibility of a supreme fiction, 
recognized as a fiction, in which men could propose to themselves a 
fulfillment. In the creation of any such fiction, poetry would have a 
vital significance. There are many poems relating to the interactions 
between reality and the imagination, which are to be regarded as 
marginal to this central theme. (L 820) 
  After a lifetime of poetic effort, Stevens presents his central achievement not 
as the creation of a supreme fiction, but the “suggestion” of the “possibility” of such a 
creation. What has appeared to many critics to be the central theme of Stevens’ poetry 
– the “interactions between reality and the imagination” – is in fact peripheral, the poet 
suggests, to the mere “suggestion” of such a grand “possibility.” The remainder of this 
section will attempt to maintain as clear a line as Stevens does here between the 
project for a supreme fiction and the poetry that suggests its possibility. If reality and 
imagination are marginal to the supreme fiction, “this central theme,” then the central 
theme is itself marginal to the poetry. Of course, the idea of a supreme fiction owes its 
prominence to Stevens’ “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” The poem attracts our 
attention, and its title leads us toward what seems a tantalizingly complex and elusive 
idea, precisely the sort of implicit profundity that literary criticism excels at hauling up 
from the depths. Yet “Notes,” as the title suggests, does not present us with any 
examples of supreme fiction; rather, it offers some preparation of the grounds for the 
arrival of one. It leads us in a series of peregrinations toward a supreme fiction, but 
stops short of the promised land. The poetry and the project keep a certain distance 
from each other, making it possible for one to stand while the other falls.    7
  Before turning to a closer look at what Stevens meant by “a supreme fiction,” 
we should pause for a moment on the wording of his biographical note. As late as 
1954, less than a year before his death, Stevens does not claim to have invented or 
discovered a supreme fiction. He suggests that men could propose to themselves a 
fulfillment in such a fiction – not that men can so propose, as we would tend to say if 
the fiction were already realized. Again, had he believed the supreme fiction to exist, 
Stevens could have written, “In the creation of any such fiction, poetry has a vital 
significance.” Had he wanted to leave his own accomplishment more ambiguous, he 
could have written, “poetry will have a vital significance” – as if to say: whether or not 
I have created such a fiction, any future creations will necessarily be poetic. But he 
chooses instead to say, “In the creation of any such fiction, poetry would have a vital 
significance.” The grammar strongly suggests that Stevens refers to something that, in 
his opinion, has not yet arrived. On the one hand, there are many poems about reality 
and the imagination, and on the other hand, there would be a vital role for poetry in 
any supreme fiction. His poems exist; the supreme fiction does not, but it is possible.  
  What, then, is a supreme fiction? The notion is grand in scale but surprisingly 
simple in structure. A supreme fiction would be a specific idea, known to be a fiction, 
that would be as valid and fulfilling as the idea of God, and which people could will 
themselves to believe. By willfully believing in this fictive idea, they might 
compensate for what has been lacking since the generally proclaimed loss of belief in 
God. Stevens truly seems to have hoped that his poetry, and in particular “Notes 
toward a Supreme Fiction,” opened the way to the invention of such an idea, a willed 
replacement for religious belief.  
  The earliest roots of the supreme fiction seem to lie in Stevens’ rejection of the 
Puritan faith of his childhood. In a January, 1940 letter to Hi Simons, Stevens writes 
of “thinking of some substitute for religion” not as a new interest but as “a habit of   8
mind with me… My trouble, and the trouble of a great many people, is the loss of 
belief in the sort of God in Whom we were all brought up to believe” (L 348). Several 
months later, in another letter to Simons, this habit of mind has metamorphosed into 
the beginnings of a project. “If one no longer believes in God (as truth),” Stevens 
continues, “it is not possible merely to disbelieve; it becomes necessary to believe in 
something else” (L 370). It is necessary to believe in something that can fill a similar 
role to that previously filled by the idea of God, but Stevens seems unable to find an 
adequate surrogate. In a hint of things to come, the specific alternatives to religious 
belief proposed in the two letters – “humanism” and “the imagination” – are both 
rejected as inadequate. Just as, in the earlier letter, Stevens notes, “Humanism would 
be the natural substitute [for religion], but the more I see of humanism the less I like 
it” (L 348), so in the later letter, he expresses dissatisfaction with a presumably 
Coleridgean, romantic conception of the imagination. “Logically,” he writes, perhaps 
with the implication “because I am a poet,” “I ought to believe in essential 
imagination, but that has its difficulties. It is easier to believe in a thing created by the 
imagination. A good deal of my poetry recently has concerned an identity for that 
thing” (L 370). Here, in 1940, a short while before the composition of “Notes,” 
Stevens has performed the crucial shift, identifying the presumed substitute for 
religious belief as “a thing created by the imagination,” or in other words, a fiction.  
  Stevens goes on in the letter to refer to “Asides on the Oboe,” a recent poem in 
which the identification between something like religious belief and fiction is made 
explicit. The work begins with the pivotal pronouncement,  
The prologues are over. It is a question, now,  
Of final belief. So, say that final belief  
Must be in a fiction. It is time to choose. (WS 226)    9
  “Final belief” could mean chronologically final, as what is reached after all 
searching has ended, the belief that will never be superseded; or logically final, as the 
ultimate ground for all other beliefs, the belief that cannot itself be questioned. Either 
way, it would seem to bear affinities with the kind of belief one previously had in 
God. Stevens asserts the equivalence of final belief and belief in a fiction even more 
clearly in an undated notebook entry, possibly from the same period: “The final belief 
is to believe in a fiction… The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction and that 
you believe in it willingly” (WS 903). The fundamental contours of the supreme 
fiction are now in place. In order to compensate for the loss of God, one will believe in 
a fiction. Only the name for this kind of fiction is lacking. 
 
  But what sort of idea, fictional or otherwise, could replace the idea of God? 
What would such an idea look like? In a frequently cited October 15, 1940 letter to 
Henry Church proposing the establishment of a chair of poetry, Stevens offers a few 
hints as he attempts to define poetry and its aims. We can read the resultant 
“Memorandum” as a partial summing up of the progression in the previous two 
paragraphs. First, Stevens cautions that by “poetry” he does not so much mean words 
written in verse form as he does “poetic ideas,” the “subject-matter” of poetry. What is 
a “poetic idea”? Stevens illustrates by example. “The major poetic idea in the world,” 
he explains,  
is and always has been the idea of God. One of the visible movements 
of the modern imagination is the movement away from the idea of God. 
The poetry that created the idea of God will either adapt it to our 
different intelligence, or create a substitute for it, or make it 
unnecessary. These alternatives probably mean the same thing, but the 
intention is not to foster a cult. (WS 806)   10
  The extreme seriousness of Stevens’ ambition for poetry is evident in his 
distinguishing this ambition, twice in a three-page memorandum, from a cult. Two 
centuries after the death of William Blake, who would mistake the goal of poetry for 
the creation of a religious sect? Yet once we understand that Stevens hoped to see 
poetry offer an adaptation, substitution, or negation for belief in God, his insistence 
becomes more comprehensible. As Stevens suggests, the three possibilities for poetry 
may amount to the same thing: “adaptation” can be seen as substitution with an altered 
original, and “making it unnecessary” can be seen as substitution with nothing. All 
three possibilities represent modes of substitution for the idea of God. The choice of 
the phrase “poetic idea,” a concept Stevens will put to great use a decade later in the 
lecture “A Collect of Philosophy,” sheds light on Stevens’ conception of the 
“voluminous master” of Christianity. In that lecture, “poetic ideas” or “poetic 
conceptions” are those “concepts of philosophy” or “philosophical ideas” that are 
“inherently poetic.” Stevens offers no straightforward definition of what he means by 
“poetic,” though he does suggest at one point that anything qualifying as a “poetic 
idea” would have to be “securely lofty” (WS 853). Again, he defines primarily 
through examples. Poetic ideas include “God” (here, similarly to the letter to Church, 
“the ultimate poetic idea” [WS 859]), “the ascent to heaven,” “the infinity of the 
world,” and the “inexhaustible infinity of a priori” in our minds (WS 860). Poetic 
ideas can also have the form of propositions, such as “all things participate in the 
good,” “the world is at once the best and most rational of worlds,” “all things happen 
by necessity,” and “everything is everywhere at all times” (WS 855, 858). Ideas such 
as these are to be themes of what Stevens calls, without elaboration, but echoing the 
title of his by then celebrated long poem, “supreme poetry” (WS 854). He notes, “The 
great poetry I have projected is a compensation of time to come” (WS 855). At the end 
of the lecture, Stevens draws even closer to the language of supreme fictions,   11
identifying the “willingness to believe beyond belief” with “the presence of a poet” 
(WS 867). If we assume Stevens’ use of the phrase “poetic idea” did not change 
substantially between his letter to Church and his lecture on philosophy, and the 
parallel phrasing regarding the idea of God suggests he did not, we might conclude 
that the supreme fiction itself, the subject of “supreme poetry,” would be a “poetic 
idea.” It would possess a family resemblance with the poetic ideas listed above: “the 
ascent to heaven,” “all things happen by necessity,” and so on. These are the sorts of 
things one might believe in, once one disbelieves in God and yet finds less fictive 
alternatives, such as humanism, somehow inadequate. 
  Stevens had used the phrase “supreme fiction” in a short poem from 
Harmonium, “A High-Toned Old Christian Woman,” but had then abandoned it. The 
name suddenly re-emerges decades later in the May, 1941 lecture, “The Noble Rider 
and the Sound of Words.” There, Stevens describes “how poets help people to live 
their lives”: 
There is, in fact, a world of poetry indistinguishable from the world in 
which we live, or, I ought to say, no doubt, from the world in which we 
shall come to live, since what makes the poet the potent figure that he 
is, or was, or ought to be, is that he creates the world to which we turn 
incessantly and without knowing it and that he gives to life the supreme 
fictions without which we are unable to conceive of it. (WS 662) 
  What does Stevens mean by “supreme fictions” in this lecture, composed only 
months before “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction”? Several key terms in the passage 
allow for very divergent interpretations, especially “poet,” “world,” “conceive” and 
“incessantly.” On the one hand, Stevens’ earlier quotation of a poem by Wordsworth 
indicates that he does, at least partly, mean “poet” to refer to historically-situated 
individuals who wrote in verse. But in what sense do their poems give to “our” lives   12
anything so essential that we would be unable to “conceive” of life without them? Do I 
really turn to the creations of Wordsworth and others like him “incessantly”? And in 
what sense do these poets create “worlds,” if, as Stevens has just said, they “adhere to 
reality” (WS 662)? Perhaps we should read “incessantly” as hyperbole, or “poet” as a 
label not only applied to writers of verse like Wordsworth but to all those who have 
shaped our inherited ways of thinking. In either case, Stevens’ use of “supreme 
fictions” in “Noble Rider” seems irreconcilable with what will soon be called “a 
supreme fiction,” the newly formed fictional substitute for God recognized as a 
fiction. He does not speak here of a “possibility” but of (plural) fictions which we 
must already possess, since if we did not possess them, we would be unable to think as 
we do. We seem forced to take the passage not as the long-awaited christening of 
Stevens’ philosophico-religious project, but as one more step in that direction, a 
deferral of the grand conjunction of signifier and signified. 
  Judging by the published letters and other writings, it seems that Stevens did 
not decide upon “supreme fiction” as the name for his long-germinating idea of a 
substitute for religious faith until he decided upon the title of his latest work. This 
appears to have happened at some point in early 1942, a little less than a year after 
writing of “supreme fictions” in “The Noble Rider.” Stevens composed the poem at an 
uncharacteristically brisk pace, assembling all 630 lines, ten for each of his sixty-three 
years, in barely three months. When he was nearly finished, he wrote his publisher 
with details of the project, now (finally) entitled “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” 
The three sections of the poem, he explained, “are three notes by way of defining the 
characteristics of supreme fiction” (L 407). When naming his poem and writing of 
these “characteristics,” did Stevens have in mind the project to invent a fictional 
substitute for the idea of God, as described in the pages above?    13
  The identification seems clear enough in letters written shortly after the poem’s 
completion, such as the following note to Henry Church. Speaking of the “fiction… of 
the NOTES,” Stevens writes: 
We are confronted by a choice of ideas: the idea of God and the idea of 
man. The purpose of the NOTES is to suggest the possibility of a third 
idea: the idea of a fictive being, or state, or thing as the object of belief 
by way of making up for that element in humanism which is its chief 
defect.
9 
  From the vague project of a substitute for religious belief that would 
compensate for the flaws in humanism, to the idea that this substitute would be a 
fiction, to the idea that this fictive idea would be willfully believed, we finally arrive at 
the name of such a substitute: the “fiction” of the “Notes,” that is, the “supreme 
fiction.”  
  The “supreme fiction” toward which the “Notes” direct themselves is, as of 
this April 21, 1943 letter, something both possible and not yet realized. As we have 
seen, it will remain possible and unrealized for the remainder of Stevens’ life, from the 
“Collect” of 1950 (“a compensation of time to come”) to the biographical note of 
1954, in which Stevens’ work “suggests the possibility of a supreme fiction.” 
Someone may one day dream up an idea of “a fictive being, or state, or thing” that will 
“adapt” the idea of God “to our different intelligence, or create a substitute for it, or 
make it unnecessary,” at the same time “making up” for the insufficiencies in 
humanism. An idea of a “being”: perhaps something like the being of God, the 
ultimate poetic idea; or of a “state”: perhaps something like the state of all things 
happening by necessity, another poetic idea; or of a “thing”: perhaps something like 
                                                 
9 Quoted in Milton J. Bates, Wallace Stevens: A Mythology of Self (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 
1985), 203.   14
heaven, the “securely lofty” poetic invention that Stevens seems to have admired 
second only to that of God. Someone may one day be inspired with such a fictive idea, 
and perhaps the inspiration will have had something to do with Stevens’ “Notes.” But 
Stevens never recorded encountering one, nor did he leave any evidence of believing 
he had created one. 
 
  In must be acknowledged, however, that a gap exists in the story sketched 
above. In the time between the composition of “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” in 
early 1942 and the April 1943 letter to Henry Church, Stevens composed a handful of 
letters that have, perhaps even more than the “Notes” themselves, fueled the quest to 
identify a supreme fiction based on or in Stevens’ poetry. In these letters, Stevens 
sometimes seems to identify “poetry” as the supreme fiction toward which the “Notes” 
gesture. For example, in the letter from Stevens to his publisher, quoted above, 
immediately after explaining that the three sections of the poem “are three notes by 
way of defining the characteristics of supreme fiction,” Stevens continues, “By 
supreme fiction, of course, I mean poetry” (L 407). What could be more unequivocal? 
Does this not prove that, in spite of all we have seen, Stevens did believe he had 
identified the supreme fiction, the grand replacement for God? Does this not prove 
that he believed poetry itself (in general, or as an ideal) would stand in for God, and 
believed this during the very period in which he composed “Notes,” which, as I 
suggested, probably provides the ultimate source of our interest in “supreme fiction”? 
Even if he later renounced the identification of poetry as a or the supreme fiction, this 
renunciation would not negate his having identified the two during the composition of 
the poem. 
  Two aspects of Stevens’ identification of “supreme fiction” and “poetry” might 
hold us back from proclaiming that Stevens did, after all, find in poetry what he could   15
not longer find in God. The first is the absence of an article. Stevens does not say that 
poetry is “the supreme fiction,” or even “a supreme fiction,” but simply “supreme 
fiction.” A poet who writes, “Where was it one first heard of the truth? The the” (WS 
186) – such a poet is not unaware of the semantic weight of an article. “The” or “a 
supreme fiction” might have suggested the supreme fiction toward which the “Notes” 
direct themselves, a supreme fiction that might fill the gaps in humanism and 
compensate for the demise of musty old Jehovah. Instead, we have “the characteristics 
of supreme fiction,” and “by supreme fiction.” We have a term without article that 
largely disappears from Stevens’ subsequent letters.  
  The second element which might give us pause is the “of course.” It seems 
highly doubtful that at any time Stevens saw the precise nature of a monumental, 
fictive successor to religious belief as something obvious or self-evident. No matter 
what the substitute for the idea of God might be, it would almost certainly not be a 
matter of course, nor of an “of course.” Whatever Stevens means to equate poetry 
with, then, it would seem not to have been “the supreme fiction” that would satisfy the 
sense of post-theistic longing. Perhaps by saying he “means” poetry when he says 
supreme fiction, Stevens uses the word “means” in a sense analogous to its use in the 
following scenario: A choreographer intends to create a “supreme spectacle” in an 
upcoming show. She informs the producer that “supreme spectacle” consists of the 
following characteristics: abstraction, change, and pleasure. “By supreme spectacle,” 
she adds, “of course, I mean dance.” Here, the “of course” makes perfect sense: the 
three characteristics of “supreme spectacle” were so general, they left it unclear that 
the spectacle would involve (of course) the medium of dance, which is after all the 
choreographer’s trade. So might Stevens have meant to note, in passing, that any 
supreme fiction would, of course, also be the subject for poetry, and would be 
embodied in poetry. He says as much in the 1954 biographical note, cited above: “In   16
the creation of any such fiction, poetry would have a vital significance.” Why would a 
supreme fiction appear in poetry, and not, say, in philosophy, politics, cuisine or 
dance? Is this purely a poet’s bias? Part of the explanation may be that Stevens, as we 
saw in the closing lines of “Collect,” identifies the very idea of “belief beyond belief” 
with the “presence of a poet.” It may be possible to create a supreme idea in theology, 
equestrian sculpture, or science, and it may be possible to create an entertaining and 
otherwise adequate fiction in prose, but a supreme fiction – both fictive and capable of 
holding its own against religious faith – demands a poetic vehicle. Or so Stevens 
seems to have believed. 
  In associating supreme fiction and poetry, Stevens may also have had in mind 
his isolated first use of the phrase “supreme fiction,” decades earlier, in the teasingly 
blasphemous poem from Harmonium mentioned above, “A High-Toned Old Christian 
Woman.” The poem begins with the declaration, “Poetry is the supreme fiction, 
madame” (WS 47), and goes on to imagine poetry and the “fictive things” of its 
creation as an exuberant, transformative “opposing law” to the severe moralizing of 
orthodox Christianity. As we have seen, the poem long predates Stevens’ 
identification of the phrase “supreme fiction” with his hope for a fictive replacement 
for religious belief, so we have no reason to read the poem’s first line through the lens 
of the later and larger project. Without any further specification, the “supreme” in 
“supreme fiction” would naturally evoke the idea of a “supreme being,” in which case 
the line might be paraphrased, “Your Jehovah, madame, may be the supreme being, 
but poetry is the supreme fiction.” Given the delight the poem takes in “fictive things,” 
such an assertion would be tantamount to suggesting that poetic fiction trumps the 
high-toned Christian’s grave deified being. Alternately, and with even more pagan 
mischief, the line could be read as saying, “Your Jehovah, madame, is certainly a 
fiction, but poetry is the supreme fiction.” Such iconoclasm might be a little too biting   17
even for Harmonium, but in either case, “fiction” would mean something like 
“imaginative creation,” “act of the imagination,” and would need no connotation of a 
specific, fictive idea with which to fill a God-shaped void. Certainly, there have been 
writers who have valorized poetry to religious heights, and Stevens may have been 
among them, but it is unclear how his respect for the powers of poetry could constitute 
an identification of the supreme fiction. In one of his undated aphorisms, Stevens 
writes, “God is a symbol for something that can as well take other forms, as, for 
example, the form of high poetry” (WS 907). God and high poetry may both be 
symbols for the same lofty idea or thing, and perhaps Stevens believed that poetry 
could serve as some recompense for the loss of God. But did he see poetry itself as a 
fictive idea that men could will themselves to believe? What would it mean for the very 
idea of poetry to be a fiction? (Does anyone not believe that poetry exists?) Perhaps 
we could imagine a poet inventing a supremely lofty, or even somehow mystical, 
conception of the nature and importance of poetry. Then we could see this conception, 
if recognized as a fiction and nevertheless believed, and if sufficient as a surrogate for 
the idea of God, as fitting Stevens’ standard for a supreme fiction. But Stevens will 
offer us little guidance in the articulation of such a self-consciously fictive and 
elevated conception of poetry. 
  By the end of 1942, Stevens had already revised the ambiguous terms of his 
letter to the Cummington Press (“By supreme fiction, of course, I mean poetry”). He 
writes to Henry Church, “I have no idea of the form that a supreme fiction would take. 
The NOTES start out with the idea that it would not take any form: that it would be 
abstract.” Then, once again adding a provocative “of course,” Stevens adds, “Of 
course, in the long run, poetry would be the supreme fiction; the essence of poetry is 
change and the essence of change is that it gives pleasure” (L 430). Keeping in mind 
the loftiness of the poetic implied by Stevens in his treatment of “poetic ideas,” could   18
this idea of changeably pleasing poetry constitute the fictive idea that might replace 
the idea of God? Yet as soon as Stevens begins to articulate how poetry might be a 
supreme fiction, he displaces it into a potential, not actual, “long run.” If poetry is to 
become in some sense the supreme fiction, then the precise contours of that sense must 
remain unclear. A month later, in another of his explanatory letters to Hi Simons, 
Stevens has become even less definite than he was to Church: “I ought to say that I 
have not yet defined a supreme fiction… I don’t want to say that I don’t mean poetry; 
I don’t know what I mean” (L 435). He laments his failure to “rationalize” the 
“enigma,” to make it more precise, and in a follow-up note two weeks later abandons 
such attempts altogether. “I think I said in my last letter to you that the Supreme 
Fiction is not poetry,” Stevens concludes, now clearly marking out the stature of the 
idea with capitals, “but I also said that I don’t know what it is going to be. Let us think 
about it and not say that our abstraction is this, that or the other” (L 438). Such refusal 
of speculation about the location of his fictive grail settles into an official position for 
Stevens. “I confess that I don’t want to limit myself as to my objective” (L 485), he 
writes of the supreme fiction in 1945. Never again does he identify “a” or “the” 
supreme fiction, or supreme fictions in general, with poetry, or with anything else. But 
on another point he is equally consistent: the kind of supreme fiction gestured toward 
in his poem’s title “would never amount to much… until it has all come to a point” (L 
435). A supreme fiction must be specific, a specific idea. It must be the sort of thing 
one could hold in one’s mind, clearly, perhaps on the way to war, as Stevens implies 
in the epilogue to “Notes.” It will be an “arbitrary object of belief,” and will serve as 
an “artificial subject for poetry, a source of poetry” (L 485). Idea, belief, subject: the 
supreme fiction may be abstract, but it will also be specific and articulable, perhaps 
with as much rhetorical precision as the older “poetic ideas” of God, heaven, or the 
necessity of all things.   19
  Once again, the crucial fact, unchanged since Stevens first began to muse on 
the need to believe in “something else” once one no longer believes in God, is that he 
does not believe this other belief to have yet been created. Even during the period in 
1942 and 1943 when he seems to speculate, in shifting terms, about the possibly poetic 
status of a supreme fiction, Stevens does not assert that he or anyone else has arrived 
at or even realized in poetic practice the relevant idea of poetry. He writes of “Notes” 
during this period, “the nucleus of the matter is contained in the title. It is implicit in 
the title that there can be such a thing as a supreme fiction” (L 430). There can be, 
though there is not. He insists to Hi Simons, in one of the rare passages in the letters 
containing an underlined phrase, “In principle there appear to be certain characteristics 
of a supreme fiction and the NOTES is confined to a statement of a few of those 
characteristics” (L 435). As if anticipating the half-century of critical controversy that 
would enshroud the supreme fiction of the poem’s title, Stevens emphasizes that the 
“Notes” do not contain that which they point toward. Nor do they constitute an 
exhaustive or systematic statement of the nature of the thing. They merely offer a 
“few” of the characteristics it would “appear” “in principle” to need. But in this letter 
to Simons, Stevens also makes his suggestion, noted above, that the subject of a 
supreme fiction “could occupy a school of rabbis for the next few generations,” and 
characterizes such work as “trying to create something as valid as the idea of God has 
been, and for that matter remains” (L 435). The supreme fiction can, conceivably, be 
created. It is possible. 
  Given the late composition of the 1954 biographical note, and its gesture 
toward “the possibility of a supreme fiction,” it seems reasonable to assume that 
Stevens hoped a sufficient supreme fiction might appear after his death. Perhaps 
tragically, or simply inevitably, it has not. I would even have to disagree with Marjorie 
Perloff’s already less-than-optimistic claim that Stevens comes to recognize in the   20
course of “Notes” that the supreme fiction can exist “only in the ‘fluent mundo’ of 
poetic language, a series of endless figural repetitions.”
10 This would suggest that 
Stevens recognized the impossibility of creating his supreme fiction. The biographical 
note of 1954 suggests he did not, and continued hoping for its arrival. His death-bed 
conversion to Catholicism, if it occurred, might even suggest that he finally decided to 
adopt an older poetic idea (God), an earlier poet’s fiction, as his own, in light of his 
inability to find a self-made fiction that would suffice.
11 
  Stevens appears to disagree with critics who identify the supreme fiction as the 
idea in “Notes” of “this invented world,” or of “the major man,” or who say that the 
supreme fiction is the ecstasy the poet experiences, or that it is a solitary poet 
sublimated into a mortal god, or “perception beyond reason,” or a belief lying behind 
Stevens’ final poems in “the world as inhuman meditation” or “reality as cosmic 
imagination,” or “a poetic vision of the supreme spirit creating space and time and 
manifesting itself in each creative act of human consciousness.”
12 At the same time, 
the poet also seems to distance himself from critics who would read a concept like the 
supreme fiction as inherently, necessarily or structurally “absent,” rather than 
provisionally lacking but capable of arriving at any moment, once someone thinks of a 
                                                 
10 “Revolving in Crystal: The Supreme Fiction and the Impasse of Modernist Lyric” in Albert Gelpi, 
ed., Wallace Stevens: The Poetics of Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1985), 52. 
11 On the conversion, see Bates 296-7, as well as the letter from Father Arthur Hanley to Stevens 
scholar Janet McCann, dated July 24, 1977, available at 
http://www.writing.upenn.edu/~afilreis/Stevens/conversion.html. “He said if he got well,” Father 
Hanley concludes, “we would talk a lot more and if not – he would see me in heaven.” If Stevens 
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difficult not to think that his success would exemplify the possibility of belief in an idea recognized as a 
fiction. 
12 See, for example, Doggett 105; Bates 234, though also see 267-8; Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: 
The Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1976), 175-6, 212, 215; Harold Bloom, “Notes 
Toward a Supreme Fiction: A Commentary” in Marie Borroff, ed., Wallace Stevens: A Collection of 
Critical Essays (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 77; Bernard Heringman, “Wallace 
Stevens: The Use of Poetry” in Roy Harvey Pearce and J. Hillis Miller, ed.s, The Act of the Mind: 
Essays on the Poetry of Wallace Stevens (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 11; Janet McCann, 
Wallace Stevens Revisited: “The Celestial Possible” (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1995), 100; B. J. 
Leggett, Late Stevens: The Final Fiction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 2005), 15; Joseph 
Carroll, Wallace Stevens’ Supreme Fiction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press), 8.   21
good enough idea.
13 It is not that any of these interpretations fails to find support in 
Stevens’ poetry. Rather, nearly all of them find more than adequate support. We seem 
to be confronted with precisely the kind of “equipollence” by which the ancient 
skeptics aimed to bring about epochê, or suspension of judgment. Perhaps we should 
set the readings off against one another in an illustration of the peculiar 
“impossibility” of reading Stevens, or the pluralistic richness of his verse. Perhaps the 
best way of reading Stevens would be to adopt one, as if by a leap of faith, or by the 
fiction that one identification alone could be correct – to choose a door arbitrarily and 
enter it, rather than standing perpetually in the interpretive hallway. Or perhaps not. 
But we can at least recognize the possibility of an alternative, and the fact that this 
alternative seems to have been the poet’s own: a recognition that he did not fully 
realize the project set out in (what he saw as) the “central theme” of his poetry.  
  
  Having argued that Stevens did not believe he had created a supreme fiction, 
and that we have no reason to doubt him, a few peripheral questions remain that might 
make us question, on independent grounds, the ultimate value of a search for the 
supreme fiction. To begin with, even if someone had arrived at a fictive, quasi-
religious idea worthy of being believed despite its evident lack of truth, even if 
Stevens or someone else had created a supreme fiction, what would the apostate have 
done with it? Certainly not prayed to it or gathered on Sunday mornings to worship it, 
as in the cult that Stevens disclaimed. The poets would have written poems inspired by 
the idea, but what would it have been like to read one of these ultimate poems? Would 
                                                 
13 See, for example, J. Hillis Miller, “Theoretical and Antitheoretical Stevens” in Frank Doggett and 
Robert Buttel, ed.s, Wallace Stevens: A Celebration (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1980), 285; Joseph 
Riddel, “Interpreting Stevens: An Essay on Poetry and Thinking,” boundary 2, 1, no. 1 (1972), 85-86, 
quoted in Melita Schaum, Wallace Stevens and the Critical Schools (Tuscaloosa: U. of Alabama Press, 
1988), 125; David R. Jarraway, Wallace Stevens and the Question of Belief: Metaphysician in the Dark 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U. Press, 1993), 141, quoted in Leggett 145.   22
the idea at their source really have given the modern apostate all that she felt was 
missing? The readers of poetry are supposed to find in the supreme fiction a 
“fulfillment,” at least for a while, until a new, changed supreme fiction comes along. 
But is this all that the ideas of religion offer? In “The American Sublime,” Stevens 
describes a peculiarly American, Emersonian and Jamesian view of what matters in 
religion, stripped of any definite surrounding community or ritual context, largely 
reduced to a personal experience that itself may be ultimately unspeakable. Perhaps 
the supreme fiction would offer something like this kind of “experience.” But the 
more one tries to imagine the concrete circumstances of the kind of idea Stevens 
envisaged, the more doubtful one becomes that anything could ultimately have 
“sufficed,” to borrow Stevens’ central term from “Of Modern Poetry.” 
  A possibility we have not yet considered is that Stevens’ idea of a supreme 
fiction could itself be the supreme fiction. But even here it is difficult to meet the 
poet’s demanding standards for what a supreme fiction must be and do. We can 
distinguish between at least two senses of “Stevens’ idea of a supreme fiction” that 
could serve as candidates for supreme fictionhood: the idea that there could be a 
substitute for the old religious ideal, recognized as invented and yet believed; and the 
specific idea that would fulfill this role, which the critics mentioned above find in one 
aspect or another of Stevens’ poetry. In the first case, it is difficult to see how such a 
mere possibility could suffice to fill the gap left by a departing God. Could believing 
in the simple, bare possibility of the eventual concoction of some grand poetic idea 
honestly suffice to drown out what Pascal referred to as “the eternal silence of these 
infinite spaces”? In the second case, we can begin by wondering whether there are 
indeed any critics who truly believe in the existence of some particular supreme 
fiction, though they know it to be of Stevens’ own creation, something he made up and 
wrote about in his poetry. We can imagine, for the sake of argument, that at least some   23
of the most philosophically or theologically ambitious interpreters of Stevens’ 
supreme fiction might, in fact, believe in the existence of what they describe – “reality 
as cosmic imagination,” for example – not only as a theme in Stevens’ poetry but as 
the truth. But a problem arises only when we consider the nature of their belief. Does 
our imaginary critic believe that reality as cosmic imagination truly exists? Or does he 
recognize that it doesn’t really exist any more than Jove in the clouds above, and yet 
believe in it anyway? Only in the latter case would “reality as cosmic imagination” 
qualify as a supreme fiction in Stevens’ sense: believed though recognized as make-
believe. Yet, if the imaginary critic knows that what he believes is not true, in what 
sense exactly does he “believe” in it? And is such a belief truly strong enough to stand 
in the footsteps of an outmoded but in time past very imposing divinity? 
  Stevens was aware of the paradox lying at the heart of any possible supreme 
fiction, though it does not seem to have caused him many sleepless nights. Simply put, 
how is it possible for anyone to believe in something she recognizes as untrue? Those 
whom Stevens called the “rationalists” in their “square hats” may see such an 
objection as a knock-down argument against the very possibility of a supreme fiction, 
but not the poet. Though Stevens tends to avoid speaking of supreme fictions in 
veridical terms, preferring locutions such as “a fiction, recognized as a fiction” to “a 
fiction, recognized as untrue,” he does not hold back from this step unconditionally, at 
least in his poetry. In a poem collected in the same volume as “Notes,” the speaker 
refers to “the nicer knowledge of / Belief, that what it believes in is not true” (WS 
291). The phrase occurs in a consideration of the world as metaphor, and the desire to 
believe in such a metaphor, but it at least suggests that Stevens’ poetic speaker has no 
categorical objection to saying of something that it is known as “not true” and at the 
same time that it is believed, or believed in. Stevens does not seem to draw any strict 
distinction between “belief” and “belief in.” It might also be noted that nowhere in his   24
writings, so far as I know, does Stevens speak of belief in something known to be 
“false,” though such a possibility would seem implied by his other statements, from a 
square-hatted point of view. Stevens favors the use of “fiction” to the more 
philosophically weighted “untrue” or “not true,” and “not true” to the more jarring 
“false,” just as he favors the cognitively weaker “recognized” to the epistemically 
definitive “known.” 
  How does Stevens extricate himself from the paradox of belief in something 
known to be a fiction? He does not take the easy way out of contradiction, by crafting 
a clever, Thomistic distinction. “The belief in a supreme fiction is of a different kind 
than ordinary belief,” or, “the supreme fiction is untrue in one sense, but true in 
another, higher sense” – the poet will have no commerce with such mickey-mocking. 
Nor does he insist that a supreme fiction would be “neither true nor false,” like 
Planck’s “working hypothesis” in “A Collect of Philosophy.” Instead, he confronts the 
paradox of fictive belief head-on and casually dismisses it. In the same 1942 letter to 
Henry Church in which Stevens imagines writing a “book of specimens” and states 
that he has “no idea what form a supreme fiction would take,” he also reports the 
following encounter with a student at Trinity College: 
I said that I thought that we had reached a point at which we could no 
longer really believe in anything unless we recognized that it was a 
fiction. The student said that that was an impossibility, that there was 
no such thing as believing in something that one knew was not true. It 
is obvious, however, that we are doing that all the time. (L 430) 
  As an example, Stevens mentions the idea of heaven: “There are plenty of 
people who believe in Heaven as definitely as your New England ancestors and my 
Dutch believed in it” (L 430). But do they recognize it as a fiction, much less know it 
to be untrue? The helpless philosopher might intrude to say helpfully that Stevens   25
must assume anyone in his time and milieu to know, in some sense, heaven to be 
unreal. Or he might attempt to square Stevens’ language with Kant’s Copernican 
revolution, as if the poet were drawing attention to the way that objects must conform 
to our knowledge, that what seemed real apart from us is in fact, in a sense, a “fiction” 
“created by us.” But must we attempt to make the irrational rational once again? Can 
we, in the end? Why does Stevens’ supreme fiction keep running into problems at 
seemingly every turn – including the final turn, its apparent failure thus far to be 
created? 
  Perhaps we should not be surprised. In Stevens’ letters, references to the 
supreme fiction are sometimes accompanied by allusions to William James’ “will to 
believe”:  
if we are willing to believe in fiction…  
the need to believe, what in your day, and mine, in Cambridge, was 
called the will to believe… (L 431, 443) 
  The most extended invocation of James’ idea occurs immediately following 
the passage about the skeptic-minded youth from Trinity, the boy who insisted “that 
there was no such thing as believing in something that one knew was not true. It is 
obvious, however,” Stevens continues, “that we are doing that all the time”: 
There are things with respect to which we willingly suspend disbelief; 
if there is instinctive in us a will to believe, or if there is a will to 
believe, whether or not it is instinctive, it seems to me that we can 
suspend disbelief with reference to a fiction as easily as we can suspend 
it with reference to anything else. (L 430) 
  It is as if Stevens has in mind a model of belief as a sort of mental feat, as if we 
could will ourselves to believe arbitrarily through a kind of inner exertion – like 
stretching something inside one’s mind into an unfamiliar pose, or lifting a peculiarly   26
heavy mental weight. On this view, coming to believe something known to be untrue 
would present only a practical difficulty, not a logical one. If we found ourselves 
unable to believe something, such as a fiction known to be untrue, an appropriate 
response might be: try harder. 
  But James does not speak of the will to believe in this way. He makes a point 
of noting the many senses in which belief is not volitional, and never argues that belief 
or a suspension of disbelief can always be brought about simply through willing. In 
fact, he regretted the title he chose for his famous essay, suggesting he should have 
called it instead “The Right to Believe.”
14 Whether or not Stevens read the essay, 
which would have been published in his first year at Harvard, or simply picked up the 
idea as it circulated through conversation, he makes the same mistake as many of 
James’ early critics, assuming that “the will to believe” refers to the possibility of 
believing in something known to be false. Nietzsche and Proust may believe in this 
possibility, but James only wanted to say that we have a right to believe in whatever is 
most advantageous to us, and only in those situations when we are faced with an 
unavoidable, momentous choice between two live options which cannot be decided on 
rational grounds.
 15 In order for an option to be a “live” option, we must find it 
plausible. Stevens’ supreme fiction would not possess this plausibility, because we 
would know it to be a fiction, presumed untrue. 
 
  Future readers of Stevens might benefit if a critical consensus emerged 
recognizing that Stevens’ grandest poetic project, as he conceived of it, turned out to 
be something of a failure. His poetry was meant to lead toward the creation of a 
                                                 
14 “I once wrote an essay on our right to believe, which I unluckily called the Will to Believe. All the 
critics, neglecting the essay, pounced upon the title. Psychologically it was impossible, morally it was 
iniquitous. The ‘will to deceive,’ the ‘will to make believe,’ were wittily proposed as substitutes for it” 
(The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition [Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1967], 457). 
15 James 718, 723.   27
specific, vivid, fictional successor to the idea of God, but it has not. The failure of this 
“supreme fiction” to materialize, despite Stevens’ best efforts, may cast a new light on 
his poetry. Perhaps it becomes less monumental, more humble and human. Certainly, 
we will be less tempted to scour the poems for a gargantuan theoretical discovery, a 
quest which can stand in the way of appreciating the many things Stevens’ poetry does 
offer, and the philosophical work it does perform. It leads the reader to expect 
something, a grand philosophical idea, ripe for systematic paraphrase and explication, 
which not even Stevens felt he had delivered. Helen Vendler, probably Stevens’ most 
perceptively sympathetic critic, has always read his poetry without reliance on a 





“Probably new fault-findings, more soundly based on Stevens’  
actual limitations, will arrive as the decades pass. Someone will  
rise to ask the hard question: How many qualifications can you  
get into a single poem and still have a poem?” 
Harold Bloom, 1985 
 
  What philosophical work can Stevens’ poetry perform for us? 
  Let me begin with a broad, simplifying sketch of two very different approaches 
to philosophy. Both are as old as Socrates, and their differences are primarily 
methodological. According to one, which might be called the problem-solving school, 
philosophy is confronted by conceptual problems for which solutions exist, and the 
goal of philosophy is to find these solutions. Philosophical questions have   28
philosophical answers waiting to be discovered through philosophical means, and if 
we could only uncover these answers, which take an assertoric form, the questions 
would be settled once and for all. If there are no answers for certain of these 
philosophical questions, philosophy can and must nevertheless define, precisely, the 
state of affairs that explains why there are and can be no answers in these particular 
cases, as opposed to others. The explanation as to why the puzzle cannot be 
unpuzzled, why the problem cannot be solved, why there are no pores through the 
given aporia, will also take the form of assertions. Needless to say, the problem-
solving conception of philosophy has proven so intuitively persuasive and 
institutionally amenable that it has dominated the field in nearly every period of its 
history. The model of problem-solving has ruled over philosophy with such a 
masterful fist that many of its proponents, in all periods, have remained wholly 
unaware of any alternative to it – and this, despite the curious failure, after nearly three 
thousand years of labor by some of the most brilliant minds ever produced, to establish 
so much as a single philosophical truth, to solve a single, fundamental philosophical 
problem “once and for all.” The textbook of philosophical truths, which all assertoric 
philosophy explicitly or implicitly aims toward, remains totally blank. Plato and 
Aristotle hoped for it to be filled after the manner of their admired geometers, but it 
has not; more recent philosophers hoped to succeed on the idealized model of the 
natural scientists, whose introductory textbooks brim with statements no longer in 
dispute, but they have not. Instead, the usual introductory textbook of philosophy, 
where used at all, is as likely as not to consist of questions rather than answers, and not 
even precisely the same questions as were asked fifty or a hundred or a thousand years 
ago, which were themselves never definitively answered. Another word for problem-
solving philosophy might be “dogmatism.”   29
  Defining the alternative to philosophical dogmatism can be very difficult. Just 
as all happy families are alike, while every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way, 
so all problem-solving philosophy is united by certain characteristics, while the 
alternatives seem to share no common core. We can see one alternative to dogmatic 
philosophy in the Socrates of Plato’s early dialogues, the figure about whom Aristotle 
said, “He asked questions but gave no replies, because he confessed he had no 
knowledge.” This is the Socrates who became the figurehead of academic skepticism, 
after the doctrinal Platonism of the later dialogues exhausted itself in Plato’s own 
Academy. The Socrates of the early dialogues did not claim to possess the solutions to 
the philosophical problems that concerned him most, such as the nature of virtue, nor 
did he claim to know whether or how such answers could or could not be obtained. If 
we view Socrates as one of the first reactions against the problem-solving conception 
of philosophy, against the interminable speculative disputes, for example, of the 
nature-philosophers who preceded him, then we can view Plato as having misread his 
teacher in the middle and later dialogues, relapsing into the very dogmatic 
asseveration that Socrates so deftly avoided. Lacking two and a half millennia of 
evidence that asserting an answer to a philosophical problem will not make the 
problem go away, Plato can be forgiven for his dogmatic turn. But the problem-
solving philosophers of today continue to write and speak as though, in Stevens’ 
words, they will finally get it right one day at the Sorbonne: as if each problem-
solving philosopher, in fact, were personally in the process of drafting an essay that 
will finally get things right, finally nail down a few solid answers, or at least a firm 
accounting of the impossibility of such. It is not uncommon to hear, for example, as a 
friend of mine once heard in a graduate philosophy seminar, philosophers in the 
problem-solving tradition say things like, “I think Professor X is basically right about 
knowledge” – as though this were the sort of thing we have been waiting for someone   30
to be “right” about, as though some arrangement of the word “knowledge” with other 
words on the pages of a research journal somewhere might finally be the correct one. 
“Did you hear? Professor X has determined what knowledge is.” “Oh really? I guess I 
can go home then.” “What will you do?” “I will go to cultivate my garden.” A recent 
example of non-dogmatic philosophy would be the later, therapeutic Wittgenstein, 
whose early analytic interpreters, like Plato, came to misread their predecessor as 
having shared their problem-solving assumptions.
16 
  A common response to philosophical dogmatism, especially among poets, has 
been an escape from argument into mystical assertion: a refusal to engage the 
gamesmanship of transitory problem-solving in favor of something else, often vaguely 
religious. Others have chosen philosophical silence. In the scheme of dogmatism and 
its alternatives, the uniqueness of Wallace Stevens’ poetry lies in its peculiar refusal of 
either silence or heavenly apodicticism. Stevens develops a unique – and in his case, 
necessarily poetic – way of treating philosophical problems without asserting ultimate 
solutions in response to them. Unlike the early Socrates or the later Wittgenstein, he 
does not avoid dogmatic philosophical assertion by asking only questions, or 
responding only without himself asserting, or asserting only things with which his 
                                                 
16 For a comparison of the later Wittgenstein’s methods with those of Sextus Empiricus, see Robert 
Fogelin, Wittgenstein (London: Routledge, 1987), 226-234. Of course, such a broad sketch can only be 
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in many cases, nothing remotely approaching a consensus yet exists.   31
interlocutor or reader could be presumed not to disagree. He does not recede into a 
silencing of his ultimate belief, but engages belief loudly and in a thousand shifting 
forms. The essential techniques of Stevens’ anti-dogmatic art have been noted by 
critics since early in Stevens’ reception. They are what Helen Vendler, in a celebrated 
essay, calls Stevens’ “qualified assertions,” and what Marjorie Perloff calls Stevens’ 
“ironic modes.”
17 Drawing from the techniques noted by the two critics, we can 
catalogue the following instruments for the evasion of philosophical dogmatism in 
Stevens’ poetry: 
•  His frequent and intricate evasions of “is” through a mobile army of 
modal auxiliaries, his “may,” “might,” “must,” “could,” “should,” and 
“would”;  
•  His more overt, stylistically definitive “as ifs,” “ifs,” “and yets,” 
“perhapses,” “seemses,” “Say that…s,” and “Suppose that…s”; 
•  His sapping of the apparent sense of a passage through the deployment 
of oxymoron, paradox and the superfluity of nonsensical sound; 
•  His seemingly perpetual openness to qualification of a statement after 
the fact, even within the same poem, no matter how exceptionally solid 
or even desperately assertive the statement might at first have seemed; 
•  His sometimes dazzling distribution of logical connectives such as 
“or,” “if,” “since,” which, like the intricate ornaments of a baroque 
cathedral, can ultimately issue into a self-dissolution of their own 
elaborate detail, resulting in a transcendent simplicity
18; 
                                                 
17 Helen Vendler, “The Qualified Assertions of Wallace Stevens,” in Pearce 163-178. Hereafter cited as 
“V.” Marjorie Perloff echoes Vendler’s thesis in a condensed form in her “Irony in The Rock” from 
Peter L. McNamara, ed., Critics on Wallace Stevens (Coral Gables: U. of Miami Press, 1972), 111. In 
turn, Vendler’s 1965 essay echoes Perloff’s language in 1964 when the former speaks of Stevens’ 
qualified assertions as “deliberate irony.” My account of qualified assertion owes a great deal to both 
critics. 
18 Vendler makes a similar point at V 175.   32
•  His helpful-toned observations, à propos of nothing, that things are 
“not” or “no longer” what no one would ever have assumed them to be: 
“It was not from the vast ventriloquism / Of sleep’s faded papier-
mâché…” – without, as often as not, going on to assert what is the case 
(V 176); 
•  His, to quote Vendler, “distinctive appropriation” of the modal “must” 
and its related “had to,” “cannot” and “could not,” with the 
connotations less of “necessity” or “clear obligation” than of “the 
constraint, the sadness, the attempts at self-conviction, the enforced 
nobility” of “obligations or destinies of a less voluntary sort” (V 166); 
•  His use of free-floating infinitives, imperatives without reply, and 
forward-casting constructions, gestures away from the facts as they 
stand to the imaginable, possible, ought-to-be, desired; 
•  His frequent questions, seemingly rhetorical, but in fact not so much 
disguised assertions as “suggestions” (V 166); 
•  And above all, his characteristic, almost constant, wriggling of syntax 
away from the rigidity of plain statement, especially between the 
iterations of repeated words: “All night I sat reading a book, / Sat 
reading as if in a book / Of somber pages” (V 174). (Which is it, 
reading a book or reading as if in a book? As Vendler suggests, Stevens 
lets the sense shift in time as the phrase unfolds.) 
  Has there ever been a more subtle and elaborated practice of qualified 
philosophical assertion than that which appears in Stevens’ verse? His specific brand 
of anti-dogmatism draws for the most part on qualifying turns of phrase and 
constructions that might appear, for example, in nearly any philosophical writing – but 
deployed through repetition and intensification to a qualitatively different effect, along   33
with an array of devices unique to poetry. (Insofar as prose contained some of the 
devices listed above, such as the splicing of syntactical forms, it would begin to 
approach prose-poetry.) His evasions cannot simply be dismissed as assertions 
rhetorically hedged against counterargument, because the qualification is part and 
parcel of the assertion. Nor can the assertive aspect simply be ignored, as though the 
poetry were somehow all qualification and no assertion: without the assertion, the 
qualification could not qualify. The qualification of a qualified assertion cannot be 
thought without the assertion, and vice versa. A language poet might attempt the 
preemptive, indefinite qualification of an assertion that never arrives, but this is not 
Stevens’ mode. His qualified assertions come whole and uncleaved, with the result 
that we do not always know what to make of his “edgings and inchings of final form,” 
to borrow a phrase from “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven.” The structure of this 
well-known phrase, incidentally, maps isomorophically onto the structure of “qualified 
assertion”: the “edgings and inchings” at once oppose themselves to any “final form” 
and yet are “of” it. So does the qualification oppose itself to the assertion and yet 
depend upon it. The two sides of the qualified assertion, in other words, must go hand 
in hand. Or is it that what Stevens offers with one hand, he takes away with another? 
Are we finally left empty-handed? What is the purpose of this fantastic legerdemain? 
  The idea of “qualification” in a rhetorical context tends to have one of two 
senses: one qualifies an assertion in the sense of rendering it more precise; or one 
qualifies an assertion by softening its force, moderating the degree to which the 
assertion is asserted, insisted upon, set forth as true. Perhaps we can imagine a scale of 
assertoric force, with, at one end, an unyielding assertion like, “It is certain 
indisputably, beyond any possible doubt, that Wallace Stevens is the most 
philosophically interesting poet in the English language.” Qualifying the assertion, in 
the sense of tempering its assertoric force, we could say, more simply, “Wallace   34
Stevens is the most philosophically interesting poet in the English language.” Going 
further, we might arrive at, “Wallace Stevens may well be the most philosophically 
interesting poet in the English language.” The further we went, the less we would 
assert our assertion, the less dogmatic we would become: “It is as if Wallace Stevens 
is, or could be seen as, the most philosophically interesting poet in the English 
language.” Or even further: “Say that Stevens is not the least of philosophers, or if the 
most, since philosophical, must be the most in English, or suppose him to be the most 
of the poet’s must…” As if traveling by asymptote, we move further and further away 
from the strong-armed dogmatism of the opening phrase. But we remain on assertoric 
territory, despite the potentially almost limitless qualification. We qualify our 
assertion, rather than abstracting the question of our belief entirely from the scene as 
Socrates might do. We do not simply propose. The assertion maintains some hold over 
us, not simply as a description of a belief that one might have, as in a thought 
experiment, or as the detached report of a belief held by someone else, but as 
something we ourselves might say, think, believe. The assertion revolves in 
consideration over a possible position, handled in a distinctive way, so that the 
possible belief remains alive. Again, Stevens avoids dogmatism not by asking only 
questions (“the early Socrates”), or asserting only that with which his interlocutor can 
be presumed already to agree (“the later Wittgenstein”), or by using his speech as a 
kind of skeptical tool without actual belief in what is said (“Sextus Empiricus”), or by 
occasionally qualifying everything he has asserted retroactively as just a good way of 
talking (“pragmatism”), but by cooling his assertoric force until it sometimes 
approaches, but never reaches, despite its enormous wintry-mindedness, an impossible 
zero degree. 
  The work of Stevensian qualification seems to encompass both making an 
assertion more precise and lessening its assertoric force, and if its peculiar art lies   35
especially in the latter, it is capable of the former as well. (Indeed, the two categories 
might be seen as not entirely distinct: the lessening of assertoric force could, at a 
stretch, be seen as a form of making more “modally precise.”) His devices allow us 
not only to approach our asymptote of unassertoric assertion, but to qualify in the 
other sense, to render more precise: to qualify “the most philosophically interesting 
poet in the English language” with “who lived in the twentieth century,” for example. 
Such lawyerly honing in on finely delineated semantic precision has a role in Stevens’ 
poetry, but it is not necessarily an anti-dogmatic one. After all, many of the most 
dogmatic philosophers have been expert at “qualifying” in the sense of restricting the 
meaning of a claim with the help of endlessly elaborated ad hoc distinctions. 
Dogmatic philosophy has tended to be less aware of the possible philosophical 
significance of the other sense of “qualification,” that of lessened assertoric force. G. 
P. Baker, a Wittgenstein scholar who once wrote at the forefront of the analytical 
reception, but came to question that approach later in life, describes in a late essay the 
inattention paid by some of his colleagues to Wittgenstein’s qualifications. 
“Ironically,” Baker notes, “the neglect of such qualifications, and even of modal 
auxiliaries such as ‘need not’, ‘may’, etc., is a conspicuous aspect of many expositions 
and analyses of Wittgenstein’s ideas, as if these niceties were not worthy of attention 
among philosophers.”
19 The philosophy that sees no real significance in the difference 
between “we might say” and “it is so” may also tend to ignore the embodied, 
contingent, and more “literary” features of language in general. “As if” will give way 
to the procrustean “is,” context will melt into air, “would” and “seem” will fall by the 
wayside, metaphor will cash out into simile into assertion of specific similarities. In 
general, any aspect of a sentence not readily translatable to logical symbols will run 
                                                 
19 Gordon P. Baker, Wittgenstein’s Method: Neglected Aspects (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 70.   36
the risk of being bowdlerized. The result is “precision,” “clarity,” and “rigor.”
20 But if 
the goal is to understand the subtle nuances of qualified assertion, Wallace Stevens 
will be the vastly superior philosopher.  
  Rather than whittling down the sense of an assertion to a sharp, indisputable 
point, Stevens’ verse more often moves between and among fairly simple, more 
indefinite claims. We do not drive toward an ultimate refinement of a crude beginning, 
like a perfect geometrical pattern hewn out of rough stone, but from one relatively 
plain form, often half-glimpsed or indistinctly qualified, to another. We move through 
Stevens’ qualified assertions as in a gallery, or as on one of the long, rambling 
weekend walks he took during his youthful stay in New York. Continuing the 
metaphor, we could say that the Stevensian mode of philosophical thinking is 
peripatetic, but not in the Aristotelian sense: it is philosophy of wandering, of error in 
its root meaning. Stevens did not, in the manner of an Aristotelian scholastic, consume 
a lifetime of massively complex philosophical systems and distinctions, digest them 
and ultimately regurgitate them in altered, synthesized form; rather, he selected a few 
appetizingly simple, sometimes paradoxical materials from the philosophical buffet 
and tasted or tested them in various, subtly altered combinations. Even when the 
philosophical work of his poetry appears most internally differentiated, most 
complicated and ornate, the materials, though elusive, remain relatively plain. They 
have been transmuted through the “literary” or rhetorical devices that are not supposed 
                                                 
20 The roots of this contemporary approach may lie partly in Frege’s imagining the “sense” (Sinn) of a 
sentence as something existing apart from the contingent material of any particular language, as if it 
were a sort of self-standing, disembodied substrate lying beneath the linguistic signs in which it 
happens to be “represented” or “expressed.” If poetry is what is lost in translation, the Fregean “sense” 
is what remains. But in Stevens, the Ding an sich is not just a thought, it is three syllables of tuneful 
German: “a vocable thing,” “a visible thing,” as Stevens writes in “The Comedian as the Letter C.” 
Once language, meaning, sense, propositions or beliefs are seen as concrete, spatio-temporal matters, 
embodied somewhere and somewhen, whether as ink on the page, vibrations in the ear, or habits of 
action, questions about the Ding an sich become, also and inescapably, questions of “the Ding an sich,” 
the letters on the page, or some other contingent, material thing. Philosophical dogmatism, for a variety 
of reasons, becomes more difficult to sustain.   37
to make any difference (so say the logically reductive dogmatists) to philosophical 
sense, but that Stevens uses to such startling philosophical effect. 
  Virtually every poem in the Stevens canon displays some of the qualificative 
devices detailed above, and the more philosophical poems likewise contain qualified 
assertion of a philosophical kind. “The Ultimate Poem Is Abstract,” a minor, twenty-
one line work from The Auroras of Autumn, the 1950 volume following that 
containing “Notes toward a Supreme Fiction,” will provide an especially fitting 
illustration of the sort of philosophical work that Stevens’ poetry can perform. Despite 
the declarative finality of its title, “The Ultimate Poem” is in fact a typically 
unresolving and qualificative meditation on questions without final answers, and their 
seeming inevitability. The poem’s irresolution is so thoroughgoing that it refuses, in 
its final two stanzas, even to resolve itself to being unresolved: it closes with a glimpse 
of a hope or longing for precisely the kind of reassuring fixity and rest that its 
preceding five stanzas seemed to deny. For convenience of reference, I will quote the 
poem once in full: 
This day writhes with what? The lecturer  
On This Beautiful World Of Ours composes himself  
And hems the planet rose and haws it ripe,  
 
And red, and right. The particular question---here  
The particular answer to the particular question  
Is not in point---the question is in point.  
 
If the day writhes, it is not with revelations.  
One goes on asking questions. That, then, is one  
Of the categories. So said, this placid space    38
 
Is changed. It is not so blue as we thought. To be blue,  
There must be no questions. It is an intellect  
Of windings round and dodges to and fro,  
 
Writhings in wrong obliques and distances,  
Not an intellect in which we are fleet: present  
Everywhere in space at once, cloud-pole  
 
Of communication. It would be enough  
If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed  
In This Beautiful World Of Ours and not as now,  
 
Helplessly at the edge, enough to be  
Complete, because at the middle, if only in sense,  
And in that enormous sense, merely enjoy. 
  Our first sense that “The Ultimate Poem” may not deliver on the stark 
resoluteness of its title – that the title will not have been abstracted, straightforwardly, 
from what the poem contains – comes in the opening line, not a statement but a 
question: “This day writhes with what?” We find ourselves not so much at the 
beginning of a poem as in the middle of an incomplete thought preceding the 
composition of a poem: a blocked passage from which the poem never fully releases 
us. What is our first model of assertion? The temporizing “lecturer,” who seems to 
have committed himself to a discourse on “This Beautiful World of Ours” for which 
he is not adequately prepared, fills the silence with an exhausted rhetoric of alliteration   39
(rose, ripe, red …), and putters to a stop at the unconvincing assurance, hemmed and 
hawed, that the planet is “right.”  
  Even the assumption in the poem’s opening question, its seemingly stable or 
quasi-assertive aspect, is soon qualified by a Stevensian “if”: “If the day writhes, it is 
not with revelations…” We can no longer even be certain that the day writhes, since 
the grounds for the question have themselves been qualified, called into question. 
From this perspective, “If the day writhes, it is not with revelations” does not so much 
offer a first triangulation of a final answer to the opening question, as a comment on 
the question: if the day writhes, it is not with answers to questions like, “This day 
writhes with what?” In fact, we might be tempted to say that if the day of this poem 
writhes with anything, it is with questions, snake-like, and moreover questionings of 
questions, like the proverbial snake of self-devouring paradox that swallows its own 
tail. In sedate, colloquial tones, the poem concludes that questioning is our inescapable 
lot – “That, then, is one / Of the categories,” as if asking questions were one of the 
fundamental forms of human understanding and, we might add, since this is the errant 
Stevens, of human misunderstanding. Previous poetic imaginings of our heroic 
imaginative powers, as in “The Man With the Blue Guitar,” have overreached, and as 
a result the “placid space” of our existence is “not so blue as we thought,” because, 
“To be blue / There must be no questions.” Having qualified blue “revelation” down to 
the counterpoised, less blue “question,” the poem seems to have taken us to a mid-
point of relative stability, a tentative conclusion about the inconclusiveness of our 
world. 
  It might seem at first glance highly presumptuous, and in all likelihood 
incomprehensible, to conclude that “asking questions” belongs among the categories, 
alongside Aristotle’s list of ten (substance, quantity, quality… asking questions?) or, 
more probably, given Stevens’ usual frames of reference, Kant’s table of twelve   40
(unity, plurality, totality, reality… asking questions?). But this baffling conclusion 
does not arrive shrouded in grand dogmatic pomp or the robes of metaphysical 
certainty. On the contrary, it rests on nothing more than an informal observation (“One 
goes on asking questions”), probably the most humble of conclusive terms (not 
“therefore,” not “thus,” but merely “then”), and the equally abbreviated and simple 
“So said…” A metaphor for the inescapability of questioning, the way in which (like 
Kant’s categories) our questions help to constitute how things appear for us, the 
conclusion of the inference is not an absolute stability, but a qualified one – qualified 
by the humble route of its arrival, and the fallibility of the steps that brought us to it. 
  What follows could stand as an epigraph to any study of qualifications in 
Stevens’ language and thought, and their significance. Speaking of this “placid space” 
in which we are, now changed and less heroic-romantically “blue,” the poem goes on: 
   It  is  an  intellect 
Of windings round and dodges to and fro, 
 
Writhings in wrong obliques and distances, 
Not an intellect in which we are fleet… 
  Reality offers resistance to us, limits the realization of our imaginings. It is 
possible for us to be wrong, and constrained in our mind’s movement. Our strengths 
are themselves qualified, restricted. As in Stevens’ earlier “Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction,” it is clear 
    that we live in a place  
That is not our own and, much more, not ourselves  
And hard it is in spite of blazoned days. 
  Even in the intellect, we are more subjects than sovereigns, more inhabitants 
than possessors. Our mind is not some heavenly receiver, “present / Everywhere in   41
space at once, cloud-pole / Of communication.” The serpentine windings and 
writhings of our thoughts do not circle toward a single center where the answers lie. It 
is as if Stevens composes a picture here of the usual movements of thought in his 
poetry. The sense of an assertion is as often as not ambiguous, not a single “winding” 
but an indefinite quantity of “windings”; the qualification winds round the assertion, 
without arriving at the center; and one qualified assertion frequently gives way to a 
conflicting other, as if with a change of mind or point of view, the centripetal winding-
round giving way to an uncentered “to and fro”: one does not “dodge” toward 
something, but away. 
  Applying the tripartite schema of “Notes,” we could say that the heart of “The 
Ultimate Poem Is Abstract” lies not in abstraction, as its title might suggest, but in 
change: the change brought about by the questioning that the poem considers, though 
not unconditionally, as our constitutive condition; the change that brought us from 
“This day writhes with what?” to the more qualified “If the day writhes,” and from the 
lecturer’s musings of rightness to the writhings of the intellect “to and fro.” Or perhaps 
abstraction is itself a kind of change. Abs-trahere, to draw away: the title may suggest 
that what is “ultimate” pulls back from us, and must do so by its nature, because to be 
“us” is to fail to possess things in their ultimacy, in finality and completion. The 
ultimate anything – poem, reality, answer – would have to abstract itself from our 
questioning categories.  
  Surprisingly, however, the poem ends neither on a note of abstraction nor of 
change, but in a vision of the third category from “Notes”: pleasure. It envisions a 
peaceful enjoyment arriving through stability, not through an authentic or playful 
acknowledgement of groundlessness: 
   It  would  be  enough 
If we were ever, just once, at the middle, fixed   42
In This Beautiful World Of Ours and not as now, 
 
Helplessly at the edge, enough to be 
Complete, because at the middle, if only in sense, 
And in that enormous sense, merely enjoy. 
  As clauses of qualification accumulate, employing so many of the devices 
catalogued in the list above, the precise nature of the qualifications begins to fall 
away. We are left with an unexpected simplicity, here, (to) “merely enjoy.” (In a 
typically Stevensian instance of syntax distorting itself through the iterations of a not-
quite-parallel structure, the “to” must be carried all the way down from “to be.”) At an 
antipode from the poem’s assertoric title, we arrive at anything but a dogmatic, 
unquestioned assertion. It “would be,” “if,” “just once,” “and not,” “enough,” “if 
only,” “in that enormous sense,” to “merely enjoy.” Not “it will be… when we are,” 
but “it would be… if we were”: a modal modification from future necessity to 
contingency. Not the absolute “good” but the relative “enough.” Soon the “we” drops 
out entirely and leaves us with the even more indefinite “it would be… to be.” The 
closing, hypothetical vision of completeness has as modest a scope as possible: “just 
once,” not “always.” It shifts from the much greater demand “to be / Complete,” to the 
lesser idea of centeredness “only in sense”: no longer to be complete but to feel so, 
without demanding objective confirmation. For this poem, “only in sense” is itself an 
“enormous sense,” sufficient for us to “merely enjoy.” Again, in paraphrasing we lose 
the sense of a drawn-out dissonance in the syntax between “to” and its final resolution 
in “enjoy,” a dissonance like that in a piece of music that draws out the listener’s 
expectation for several long moments before returning, finally, to the tonic. 
  As Vendler notes, Stevens’ “untoward modulations of tense are simply not 
available to the critic who tries to paraphrase Stevens in prose” (165). It might be   43
possible to say, in summing up some of the above interpretation, “The ultimate poem 
is abstract; but our human poem, it appears, must be qualified. We will only find 
ourselves complete by abandoning the demand for objective confirmation of our 
completeness.” But it is important to recognize that the poem does not conclude, 
assertively, that we are doomed to inconclusiveness. It qualifies its way to a qualified 
end. Any philosophical paraphrase, to the degree that it achieves a helpfully definitive 
assertoric synthesis, must to that degree lose touch with what may be Stevens’ most 
significant philosophical work in the poem. 
 
  Stevens harbored a secret wish to be the Dante of his time, and in one respect 
we can now see how his dream could one day, at least in a small way, come true.
21 We 
remember Dante, at least in part, as the poet of medieval scholasticism, a 
philosophical movement whose most remarkable feature may be the degree to which it 
no longer exists. It is a dead tradition, or as dead as such a dominant philosophical 
tradition can become. Though its influence on the philosophical and religious thought 
of today can be easily traced, there are vanishingly few philosophers who directly 
concern themselves with finding the correct solution to the arcane scholastic puzzles 
that Aquinas and his contemporaries, predecessors and followers attempted to solve 
(“Do angels know themselves?”). One reason, of course, is that epistemology 
displaced scholasticism as the dominant Western philosophical tradition. 
Contemporary philosophers, like Richard Rorty, who advocate setting aside the tired 
skeptical problems of epistemology, and with them the epistemological tradition in 
general, often point to the demise of scholasticism as a model for the possibility of 
changing the philosophical conversation. (The fact that Rorty’s call for an end to 
epistemological puzzling has so often been mistaken as a call to end philosophy 
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illustrates how deeply rooted epistemology continues to be. For many, it is difficult to 
imagine a viable philosophy without a focus on solving epistemology-related 
problems.) Like the work of Stanley Cavell, Stevens’ closest philosophical peer in the 
exploitation of qualified assertion, Stevens’ poetry and prose dwell in the 
intercalations of narrowly philosophical, epistemological problems and problems of 
broader human scope. If the era of epistemology ever comes to an end, just as 
medieval scholasticism once did, Stevens may get his wish. He may become the poet 
of epistemology, the Dante of our perhaps fading philosophical era. One day a 
student’s first exposure to the idea that there is some threatening “abyss” of epistemic 
uncertainty between me and the things and people around me may come from a poem 
by Wallace Stevens.  
  Unable to understand the pathos of the situation, the student may ask his 
professor for some explanation, and the professor may helpfully offer: “But how can 
you be certain that you are not deceived by demons, or that you are not a brain in a 
vat? And if you cannot be certain of that, how can you be certain of anything?” The 
student may shrug, slightly perplexed that so much was made out of so little, if in fact 
it was. But if he returns to the poetry of Stevens with a suitably wintry mind, he may 
come to understand the odd contours of the epistemological way of thinking, its 
dualistic hopes and disappointments. He may eventually read the following passage 
from Stevens’ late poem “The Rock”: 
The poem makes meanings of the rock, 
Of such mixed motion and such imagery 
That its barrenness becomes a thousand things 
 
And so exists no more. This is the cure 
Of leaves and of the ground and of ourselves.   45
  It seems to me no coincidence that in some of Stevens’ final poems, the closest 
he comes to a resolution of what he calls “the dumbfoundering abyss / Between us and 
the object,” perhaps the central dilemma of an epistemologized world, comes in a form 
suited to the ongoing questioning and qualifying evasions of his poetry. By making 
“meanings,” plural, of the inhuman rock, by making of the rock’s barrenness a 
thousand poetic images and sounds, covering it in the overabundant leaves of an 
unresolving human imagination, rather than by searching for the single dogmatic 
answer allegedly lodged impenetrably within it, poetry may cure us not of our 
limitations in the face of the rock – these often appear in Stevens’ final poems to be 
inescapable – but of the sense that through the rock we are chained to something 
beyond consolation, a “total leaflessness” in a barren sense. Poetry will not assert, as 
dogmatic philosophy might, that the problem of the rock is an epistemological or 
ontological question of its nature. It will not assert an answer. Rather, it will be 
through the overflowing multiplicity of images, qualifications, fictions and sounds, 
precisely those linguistically embodied and contingent aspects of Stevens’ thought that 
dogmatic philosophy might most tend to ignore, that the rock as an unappeasable 
desolation might be “cured.” 
   46
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